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This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and 
corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public 
good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate 
the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement 
the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election 
after a finite, fixed term. Under relative performance evaluation, dynamic incentives impose 
more restriction on rent appropriation in comparison to the static case. 
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The present work investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, political in-
stitutions and political corruption. While the traditional textbook view of the politician as
a benevolent maximizer of social welfare is passé, there is no consensus about the alterna-
tive behaviour. At one extreme, one encounters the Virginia School’s view of the politician
as a Leviathan, maximizing the government size with a high degree of corruption. At the
other extreme, there is the Chicago School’s view that politicians’ behaviour is shaped by
electoral incentives and party politics. If politicians are indeed rational, then political com-
petition must align their interest with that of the majority of voters (otherwise they forfeit
elections). In other words, elections serve as disciplinary stick.
The above conclusion can be used to prescribe welfare maximizing political institutions.
High degrees of economic decentralization accompanied by the creation of multiple political
jurisdictions ("deepening of democracy", to borrow a phrase from the United Nations Human
Development Report (2002) make local politicians more accountable to their lower level
constituencies. As a result, the degree of political competition increases, yielding a higher
welfare for the population and reducing corruption.
A growing literature, known as the political agency literature, investigates how elections
may serve as an appropriate stick. The idea is to treat the voters as principals and the
politicians as agents. According to this point of view, rent appropriation by politicians
occurs only if there exists imperfect information. Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) developed
models of moral hazard where the politicians’ eort levels are not observable by voters, and
that allow the politicians to capture some rent. Here, the politicians care only for rent and
nothing else. In a dynamic sense, it is optimal for the voters to oer a positive rent to the
election-seeking politicians in order to avoid higher rent extraction in the current period.
On the other hand, the informational asymmetry may take the form of pure adverse
selection and an associated signalling game. Such asymmetries are exploited in the electoral
cycle model of Rogo (1990) and Rogo and Sibert (1988). Before the elections, the politi-
cians try to signal their competence, and engage in lower rent extraction than post election
time period. The role of elections, in such models, is to choose the right type of politicians.
A related strand of literature takes into account both adverse selection and moral hazard.
In this strand, there are dierent types of politicians (like in adverse selection models), and at
the same time there exists imperfect information on politicians’ action. The role of elections
is two fold: choosing the right type of politician and restraining the politicians’ rent seeking
activity.
2A question that naturally arises is the following: how do the voters evaluate the per-
formances of the incumbent politician? While there are a host of models in this regard,
one recent strand of literature, known as theory of yardstick competition, ﬁnds considerable
empirical and theoretical attention. The idea is the following: voters judge the performance
of the incumbent using the yardstick of performance of the politician in a neighboring state:
i.e. the incumbent must perform well relative to the neighbor. Needless to say, such models
are well suited to the environment of multiple jurisdictions, e.g. that of a federation.
The models involving both moral hazard and adverse selection have been successfully
applied to such yardstick competition.The ideas of relative evaluation and yardstick com-
petition come from the industrial organisation literature (Shleifer,1985). A major paper
that exploits the idea within a political economy framework is Besley and Case (1995), who
show, using data on US state elections, that vote seeking and tax setting patterns can be
predicted by theory of yardstick competition. Besley and Smart (2001) demonstrate that
the eect on voter welfare may be ambiguous. While yardstick competition allows the de-
tection of bad incumbents, it also induces more rent extraction by bad incumbents who are
never going to be re-elected. Belleﬂame and Hindricks (2005) show if the re-election eect is
strong, then yardstick competition always disciplines the incumbent as well as provides the
desired sorting: so yardstick competition can never go "the wrong way". Ellis, Dincer and
Waddel (2005) ﬁnd evidence that decentralization, by allowing yardstick competition among
politicians, reduces corruption.
A problem with such a speciﬁcation is that politician types are not endogenous. For our
purpose, we think the ﬁrst generation moral hazard modelling has the virtue that a single
politician, depending on the situation, can be either good or bad. On the other hand, for the
yardstick models involving moral hazards, it requires that the voters (as in second movers in a
dynamic game of imperfect information) be able to extract signals from incumbent behavior
and judge whether the incumbent is good or bad. This might be placing too much importance
on voters. Instead, we assume that given a yardstick voting rule to which the voters commit
to, the contest is among neighboring incumbents, that is, the actual policymakers.
The present paper broadly belongs to the ﬁrst generation models, but assumes that the
voting rule uses a yardstick criterion. The incumbent can provide a public good and extract
rent, which are ﬁnanced by imposing a distortionary tax on the population. An incumbent
derives utility from rent as well as popularity. The popularity index depends on voters’ net
welfare and esteem/reputation. Reputation is decreasing in rent appropriation. Under yard-
stick criterion of performance evaluation, the voting behaviour reﬂects the fact that higher
3relative rent lowers the popularity index of the incumbent. To contrast the performance of
yardstick competition, we use a hypothetical case where the absolute performance is used by
t h ev o t e r st oe v a l u a t et h ep o l i t i c i a n .T h i si sm o r ep r e v a l e n ti nau n i t a r yc o u n t r y ,c o m p r i s i n g
of one head of the state. On the other hand, yardstick competition is more likely to occur
in a federal economy, such as India, Australia, Canada, the USA. However, the scope of
application of our model is not limited to federal economies. Within the EU, voters may
well use the performance of a neighbouring country as a yardstick: the fact that the Spanish
economy recently overtook the Italian one (on the basis of GDP per head) has helped the
re-election of the Spanish incumbent government. Our model, however, does not applies to
autocracies, where changes of governments do not result from democratic processes.
We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent
seeking without assigning an ex ante type on the politician. On hindsight, the intuition is
the following: the power of judgement is somewhat lost once we use a yardstick criterion.
If the politician knows that the voters’ judgement is relative, then he has to perform only
a "little better" than his neighboring government in order to get re-elected. In equilibrium,
there are cases when both of them perform equally bad, and yardstick competition fails
to distinguish between them. Thus both the sorting and restraining eect of election may
fail.This eect is more acute as we move from perfect to imperfect information environment
where the incumbent of a particular province knows his popularity index but not that of the
neighboring incumbent. It can be shown that expected rent appropriation under imperfect
information is higher than the perfect information case, and is increasing in the noise.
We complement the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politi-
cian faces an election after a ﬁnite, ﬁxed term. The stock of reputation or esteem builds
up or decays over time. The incumbent cares for both instantaneous as well as the end-of-
term reputation. The idea that an incumbent politician’s long-term interest may restrain
his short-term opportunistic behaviour has been well explained by Olson (2000) who made a
famous comparison between between a roving bandit and a stationary bandit; see also Dalgic
and Long (2006). We show that under unitary performance evaluation, dynamic incentives
restrain the politician only if the shadow value of reputation (that measures current and fu-
ture marginal beneﬁts of increased reputation) is su!ciently high throughout the term. For
such a high shadow value to exist, beneﬁts of both instantaneous and end-of-period reputa-
tions have to be high enough. On the other hand, in comparison to the static case, dynamic
incentives imposes more restriction on rent appropriation under relative performance evalu-
ation. The reason is the following. A high shadow value imposes restriction on current rent
4expropriation. In the case where relative evaluations matter, higher shadow price in one
region reduces incentive of rent expropriation in the other region as well.
The present work is divided into the following sections. Section 2 describes the basic
model. Sections 3 and 4 compare and contrast unitary evaluation criterion with relative
criterion under a static setting. Section 5 analyses the dynamic model. Section 6 concludes.
2A S t a t i c M o d e l
Let l be the tax collected from province l,a n dul be the rent that accrues to the government
of province l. The amount (l  ul)  jl is used to supply a local public good. The utility
function of the voters in province l is
Z(jl>l)=X(jl)  F(l)
where X(=) is concave and increasing in jl,a n dF(=) is convex and increasing in l. The func-
tion F(=) includes the cost of forgone consumption of private good, as well as distortionary
costs associated with non-lump-sum taxation.
The government’s objective function, denoted by Jl, is assumed to be a weighted average
of (i) social welfare, (ii) politicians’ private beneﬁts from rents, E(ul), and (iii) the politicians’
valuation of the public esteem, denoted by
Hl = Hl0  lyl(ul)
Here lyl(ul) is a measure of the loss of esteem that arises from the public’s perception of
rent extraction by politicians, and Hl0 is a constant. The function yl(=) is strictly convex
and increasing in ul, l is a positive parameter which reﬂects the degree of sensitivity of the
public. The function E(=) is concave and increasing in ul.
2.1 Unitary state outcome
The provincial government chooses ul and l to maximize
Jl  X(l  ul)  F(l)+E(ul)+Hl0  lyl(ul)
It is convenient to decompose this maximization problem into a two-stage problem. In
the ﬁrst stage, for a given ul, we determine the optimal l, and express this as a function
l(ul). In the second stage, we determine ul.
5Thus, the ﬁrst stage problem consists of solving the optimal provision of public good, for




X(l  ul)  F(l) (1)
In the second stage, the government chooses ul to maximize Jl = ZW(ul)+E(ul)+Hl0lyl(ul)




from which we obtain the optimal amount of tax as a function of ul







X00  F00 ? 1 (3)
Substituting the function l(ul) into (1), we get
Z
W(ul)=X(l(ul)  ul)  F(l(ul))





0(l(ul)  ul) ? 0 (4)












This shows that social welfare is concave in ul.
Now, turning to the second step, we ﬁnd the optimal rent to be sought by the government.
F r o mt h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ so b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o n ,
Jl = Z
W(ul)+E(ul)+Hl0  lyl(ul)








The second order condition is satisﬁed because ZW(ul) and E(ul) are concave in ul,a n d








l (ul)  ly
00
l (ul) ? 0
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0(l(u
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l )  u
rsw
l ) (7)
The left-hand side of eq (7) is the marginal beneﬁt (MB), and the right-hand side is the
marginal cost (MC). Since MB is downward sloping and MC is upward sloping, the optimal
rent is uniquely determined. An increase in l will shift the MC curve up, and result in a
lower amount of rent sought. This result is stated as Proposition 1 below:
Proposition 1: Increased voter sensitivity decreases rent seeking.





















where {  ZW00(ul)+E00
l (ul)  ly00
l (ul) ? 0.
2.2 Relative Evaluation
Now assume that voters in province l cares about the relative performance (in terms of
corruption) of government l.L e tl be a parameter, where l 5 [0>1],a n dd e ﬁ n e
}l  ul  lum
W ea s s u m et h el o s so fp o p u l a r i t yi sp r o p o r t i o n a lt ot h ef u n c t i o nyl(}l):
yl = yl(ul  lum)  yl(}l)
with y0
l(}l) A 0 and y00
l (}l) A 0.I nt h ep o l a rc a s ew h e r el =0 , we are back to the absolute
performance evaluation of the preceding sub-section. We will focus on the other polar case,
where l =1 ;i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt ot h i n ko ft h i sp o l a rc a s ea st h el i m i t i n gc a s ew h e r el tends
to 1 from below.
Given um, the provincial government l chooses ul and l to maximize
Jl  X(l  ul)  F(l)+E(ul)+Hl0  lyl(ul  lum)
Again, for any given ul, the choice of l must maximize X(l ul)F(l). So we obtain the
function l = l(ul),e x a c t l ya sb e f o r e .T h u s
Jl = Z
W(ul)+E(ul)+Hl0  lyl(ul  lum)








l(ul  lum)=0 (8)





l (ul)  ly
00
l (ul  lum) ? 0
which is satisﬁed because of the concavity of ZW(ul) and of E(ul) and the convexity of yl(}l).
Equation (8) implicitly deﬁnes the reaction function
ul = Ul(um;l> l)
where l and l are regarded as parameters. The slope of the reaction function Ul(um;l>l)
can be obtained by applying the implicit function theorem to the following equation
I





l(ul  lum)=0 (9)
































l (}l)+l(ul) A ly00
l (}l), the slope of the reaction function is positive and strictly less
than 1 if and only if l 5 (0>1].
A similar analysis applies to government m’s reaction function um = Um(ul;m> m).The
intersection of the two reaction curves determines a unique Nash equilibrium (uQ
l >u Q
m ).I ti s








? 1 is satisﬁed.
Unlike the unitary case, the voter sensitivity in one region aects the equilibrium rent
extraction in both provinces.
Proposition 2: Increased voter sensitivity in one region reduces rent-seeking in both
regions if l and m are positive.
Proof:
8First, from (9) we can show that an increase in l will shift the reaction curve down (i.e.,













































































2.3 Comparison of rents under relative evaluation and under uni-
tary evaluation
L e tu sf o c u si nt h ec a s ew h e r et h ep a r a m e t e r sa r et h es a m ef o rb o t hp r o v i n c e s . W eh a v e
seen above that (uQ
1 >u Q
2 ) depends on 1 and 2. Under unitary evaluation, 1 = 2 =0 .
Under symmetric relative evaluation, 1 = 2 = A0. We consider the eect of a change
from  =0to  =1 .I fs t a r t i n gf r o ma n y 5 (0>1)> a small increase in  always increase
(uQ
l >u Q
m ) then we can conclude that a discrete jump from  =0to  =1results in more rent
seeking.
Proposition 3: Relative performance evaluation always generates more rent.










































? 0=In other words,
increased  reduces voters’ welfare.
Remark: The intuition behind proposition 3 is as follows. The incumbent knows that
the voters’ judgement is relative: he has to perform only a "little better" than his neighboring
government in order to get re-elected. In equilibrium, there are cases when both of them
perform equally bad, and yardstick competition fails to distinguish between them. Thus
both the sorting and restraining eect of election may fail.
3 Dynamic Rent Appropriation
So far, we have seen that relative performance evaluation may lose its ability to restrict
politicians if the provinces are symmetric in ‘punishment’. Now we want to see if the same
results apply if the incumbent of region l operates over a time horizon of [0>W].W e s h o w
that dynamic considerations make the relative evaluation criterion better than the static
case in terms of restraining the politician, even if the provinces are otherwise symmetric.
Every W years, there is an election. The chance that the incumbent is re-elected depends
on the stock of esteem the electorate has for him at that time. This stock is denoted by
Vl(w).( W ea v o i dt h en o t a t i o nLl because of the possible confusion between ﬂow and stock).




3lw [E(ul)+$lVl(w)]gw + h
3lW!(Vl(W))
where !(Vl(W)) is the politician’s perceived expected value of his remaining political life and
$l refers to the weight that the politician puts on the current stock of reputation.
The stock of esteem/reputation changes over time according to the following dynamic
equation
˙ Vl(w)=X(l(w)  ul(w))  F(l(w))  lyl(ul(w)>u m(w))
where Vl(0) is given and the incumbent chooses Vl(W).
103.1 Unitary State
In this case, um does not appear in the function yl= For simplicity, we assume the linear
functional form for ! :
!(Vl(W)) = lVl(W) where A0.
Let l be the co-state variable associated with the state variable Vl.The Hamiltonian is
K = E(ul)+$Vl +  l [X(l  ul)  F(l)  ly(ul)]




0(l  ul)  F




0(ul)  l [X
0(l  ul)+ly
0(ul)] = 0 (14)
˙ l = ll  $l (15)
l(W)=l (16)
Equation (16) is the transversality condition. It says that the shadow price l at the terminal
date W must be equal to the marginal contribution of Vl(W) to the salvage value function
!(Vl).The linear dierential equation (15), together with the transversality condition (16)
uniquely determine the optimal time path of the co-state variable (shadow price) l(w)=










































3l(W3wl) A 0 (18)











11which is positive if ll A$ l and negative if ll ?$ l.
We now determine the time path of rent ul(w).F r o me q u a t i o n( 1 3 )w ec a ne x p r e s sl(w)







X00  F00 ? 1 (20)
E q u a t i o n s( 1 9 )a n d( 2 0 )a r ee x a c t l yt h es a m ea se q u a t i o n s( 2 )a n d( 3 )o ft h es t a t i cs e c t i o n .






0(ul)] = 0 (21)
Equation (21) shows that the optimal ul(w) is a function of the optimal shadow price W
l(w)

















In view of the inequality (20), the expression inside the curly brackets {===} is negative.
H e n c ew ed e d u c ef r o me q u a t i o n( 2 2 )t h a tul(w) is increasing over time if and only if W(w) is
decreasing over time, i.e. if and only if ll ?$ l.
Comparing equation (21) with the equation (7) of the static case, we see that dynamic
rent is lower than static rent if and only if W is greater than 1=
Clearly, if W(W) A 1 (i.e. l A 1)a n dW(w) is a decreasing function of w, i.e., l ?$ l@l,
then , W(w) A 1 for all w  W .W et h u so b t a i nt h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t :
Proposition 4: Under the unitary case, if (i) the politician attaches a high terminal
value l per unit of esteem, (ii) he is patient (i.e. l is small), and (iii) the weight attached
to instantaneous esteem is high, then dynamic incentive restricts the politician vis-à-vis the
static case.
3.2 Relative Evaluation
Under relative evaluation, the equation of motion becomes
˙ Vl = X(l  ul)  F(l)  lyl(ul  lum)
Since the rate of change in the stock of esteem Vl depends not only on ul but also on um,
the optimal time path of rent extraction by one provincial government depends on what it
12expects the the rent extraction path of the neighboring government will be. Thus the two
provincial governments are engaged in a dierential game. (See Dockner et al. (2000) for a
comprehensive treatment of dierential games, with many applications in economics.) The




0(l  ul)  F




0(ul)  l [X
0(l  ul)+ly
0
l(ul  lum)] = 0 for m 6= l (24)
˙ l = ll  $l
l(W)=l











3l(W3w) for l =1 >2 (25)
Use (23) to express l as function of ul (independent of l), and substitute into (24) to
get
E
0(ul)  l [X
0(l(ul)  ul)+ly
0
l(ul  lum)] = 0 for m 6= l (26)
This equation yields the reaction function
ul = Ul (um;l> l) (27)





l  1]  lly
00
l }gul + llly
00
l gum =0












l  1)X00  E00
l ]
A 0=









l  1)X00  E00
l ]
? 0
The intersection of the two reaction functions ul = Ul (um;l> l) and ul = Um(ul> m> m)
determines the rents obtained at time w when we substitute the value for l(w) and m(w)
from equation (25).
N o wl e tu ss h o wh o wa ni n c r e a s ei nm (hence an increase in m(w))a ects the equilibrium
rents at time w in all provinces. Using equation (27), we write the system of equations
u
Q
1 (w)  U1(u
Q
2 (w)> 1(w)> 1)=0
13u
Q
2 (w)  U2(u
Q
1 (w)> 2(w)> 2)=0










































Thus we have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 5:The higher is the neighboring incumbent’s shadow value of esteem (m(w)),
the lower is ul (w) in province l=
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we analyzed the extent to which elections can make a politician benevolent.
We assume that politicians provide a local public good to their constituency and appropriate
some rent. The public good and the rent are ﬁnanced by taxing the local populace. The tax
imposes distortion cost on the local populace. If the politicians appropriate rent, they are
likely to lose their reputation. What is crucial here is how the electorate views politicians’
performance. Depending on the electorates’ institutional structure, there are two possibil-
ities. It may be the case that politicians’ absolute performance matters: this is the case
for unitary electorate, e.g. a nation, or when information about the neighboring electorate
is costly. On the other hand, the voters may compare the incumbent’s performance with
that of the neighboring electorate’s incumbent. This is more prominent within a federal
country or a confederation of countries (such as E.U.), where such information is readily
available. We discussed the conditions under which a unitary criterion does strictly better
than a relative criterion. We found that when performance evaluation depends on the dif-
ference between rents, the unitary criterion (that closely mimics the corresponding relative
criterion) does strictly better than the relative criterion. However, introduction of dynamic
considerations imposes more restrictions on the politicians, through the shadow price eect,
under the relative evaluation than unitary performance evaluation.
We would like to mention some areas to which the current research may be extended.
The ﬁrst issue is theoretical in nature. In the present paper, the public good is a ﬂow,
14but often there exist public goods which exhibit dynamic build-up over time. If politicians’
reputation depends on both public good and rent, a ‘stock’ public good may allow for more
rent diversion.
Second, the following testable hypotheses emerge, which can be evaluated using real
world data:
(a) In a democracy where elections are very frequent (such that, at the limit, the decision
making process degenerates into a static setting), incumbents may be less honest than in a
country where the incumbents are appointed for a longer term.
(b) Within countries where the incumbents are appointed for a longer term (i.e. dynamic
considerations matter), politicians in a federal country (where the voters employ relative
performance evaluation) are likely to be more honest than their unitary-nation counterparts.
Thus there exists a challenging agenda for future research.
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